The U.S. is a leader in global nonproliferation efforts, from preventing new nuclear states to securing nuclear materials and technology. However, preventing nuclear terror requires efforts on the domestic front, as well. U.S. ports present a potential vulnerability; securing these ports requires improving our capacity to detect and secure nuclear materials that could arrive in shipping containers that appear harmless.
Nuclear challenges have changed over the past twenty years, but they have not disappeared. The likelihood of nuclear conflict between the Cold War superpowers has decreased, but the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Illicit Trafficking Database has documented 615 incidents of loss or theft of nuclear or other radiological materials since 1993, including 16 cases involving highly enriched uranium. Terrorist organizations like Aum Shinrikyo and Lashkar-e-Taiba are known to be interested in acquiring a nuclear device, and Al Qaeda has been pursuing a nuclear weapon for over 15 years.
The players have changed, and the means of delivering a nuclear weapon have changed too. As ASP Consensus member Graham Allison, notes, “A nuclear weapon is more likely to arrive in a shipping container than on a missile.”
Shipping containers are relatively simple and inexpensive, in other words, “The Poor Man’s ICBM.” A 2006 RAND Corporation Study projected the results of a single 10-kiloton nuclear device detonated from within a shipping container at the Port of Long Beach, California. In a matter of seconds, 60,000 lives lost, 600,000 homes destroyed, the port’s infrastructure decimated, and a trillion dollar economic crisis.
Container security is a serious concern, but addressing it raises many questions.
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